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ANNA K. PHYLE, Appellant, v. CLINTON T. DUFFY, _
.
Warden of the State Prison, etc., Respondent.
.
(1] 0rimIDal Law-J'uclgment--BncutiOD of Death 8eDteDce8aDitJ JnveatlgatioD.-The Supreme Court afBrmed a judgment denying a petition for writ of mandate to eompel the
warden of the atate prison to institute a prooeeding under
Pen. Code, 13701, for a jury determination of the aanity of
a prisoner who had previously been adjudged inaane bya jury
and couunitted to a atate hospital following a death •• Dtenoe,
and who, on a certification by the auperintendent of aueb 11....
pitaJ that he was laDe, was returned to prison for UeeutiOD,
where, regardJess of whether l"..&Ddamus was an appropriate
remedy, the prisoner was aocorded a full hearing on the iaaue of
his aanity at that time, and the evidence aupporied a determination that the warden then had no "pod reaacm" to believe
that the prisoner had become or was iDaane.

(1] See 8 Oal.Jur. 845.
Die. JLeference: [1] Criminal I...., 1104S.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Marin
County. Arthur Coats, Judge.- AtUrmed.
Proeeeding in mandamus to compel warden of state prison to
institute proceeding for determination of sanity of a prisoner
under sentenee of death. Judgment denying writ, afIlnned.
Morris Lavine for Appellant.
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, and Clarence A. Lbm,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.

)

EDMONDS, J.-William Jerome Phyle'. convietion of
murder and sentence to. death was reviewed andafllnned
upon appeal. (People v. PArle, 28 Cal.2d 671 [171 P.2d
428J.) In December, 1946, two days prior to the time
set for his exeeution, the warden of San Quentin Prison,
as authorized by section 3701 of the Penal Code, stated
to the District Attorney of Marin County that there was
"good reason to believe" Phyle was insane. In a proceeding to determine that question, a jury adjudged Phyle
to be insane, and he was eommitted to the state hospital. Less
than one month later, the superintendent of the hospital certified to the Governor that Phyle had recovered his sanity.
He was returned to prison and the. execution was set for the
following May.
Shortly before that time, a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus was filed with this court. The writ issued and the
execution was stayed. Subsequently the writ was dismissed
and Phyle was remanded to custody for the execution of the
sentence of death. (30 Cal.2d 838 [186 P.2d 134].) Apetition for rehearing was filed, and denied. March, 1948, was
then fixed for execution. Again, a new legal proceeding was
commenced and Phyle's petition to the United States Supreme
Court for certiorari and stay of execution was granted. Upon
the further consideration of the matter, the writ of certiorari
was dismissed. (334 U.S. 431 [68 S.Ot. 1131, 92 L.Ed. 1494J.)
A third date, September, 1948, was then fixed for the execution of Phyle, but a few days before that time, Phyle'. mother, .
on his behalf, filed in the superior court a petition for a writ
of mandate to compel the warden to institute a proceeding
-.Aasiped by Chairman of .Tudieial Couacil.
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for the determination of his sanity by a jury in accordance
with thc provisions of section 3701 of the Penal Code. An
alternative writ was u;'o;uf·d and a stny of execution gr:mtt'd.
Upon a trial, the court found that there was no reason to
believe Phyle was insane. The alternative writ was discharged.
and the stay of execution was neated.
The present appeal is from that judgment. Prior to the
iiling of any briefs, the attorney general moved for the fol·
lowing relief in the alternative: (1) To dismiss the appt'ilJ
as frivolous and taken soleJy for dt'lay; (2) To affirm 'he
judgmt'nt; (3) To advance the cause on the calendar aud
submit the same for deeision; or (4) For such other relif'f
as may be proper. Following tht' argumt'nt upon the motion,
the appeal was advanced fnr hf'aring on the merits.
[1] As grounds for reVf'rsaJ of the judgment. Pbyle 8Sserts: (1) that since he wa~ declart'd insane by the verdict of
B jnry, he is presumed to be insallf' until II jury finds to the
contrary; (2) section 3704, if constitutionally construed. gives
him aright to a trial by jury on that question; (3) the failure
to grant a jury trial in the prt'sent procet'ding was a violation
of due process under the Fedt'ral Constitution: (4) any procedure denying a full judicial hearing. as providt'd by the
laws of the State of California is 8 denial of duf' process
under the guarantee of the Federal Constitution: and (5)
section 3704 of the Penal Code is constitutional only if eon·
strued as requiring a trial by jury upon the issue of reNtora·
tion to sanity. In substance, Phyit"s position is that both
under California law and the requirements of federal rlne
process, he is entitled to a trial by jury to determine whether
he has been restored to sanity.
After section 3704 of the Penal Code was construf'd by this
eourt adversely to Phyle in the habeas corpll~ prof'eerlin~
(1n re Phyle, 30 CaL2d 838 [186 P.2d 1341 I, the Snrrprne
Court of the United States granteii a writ of f'ertiorarl "bt>cause of the serious nature of the due process eontt'ntionR
presented in the petition. I t The questions presented. as statl'd
by the court, were .. that eXt'l'ution of an insanf' man it: (If.
fensive to the fundamt'ntal prinl'iples of life and justice which
lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. AdamBon v. California, 322 U.S. 46 l67 s.Ct. 1672. 91 L.Ed. 1903,
171 A.L.R. 12231. Carter v. llli1lots. 329 U.S. 173 f67 S.Ct.
216. 91 L.Ed 172]. and .. that liff' shall not be taken by
th~ state as the result of the uureviewable ex parte determina-
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tion of a cruciaJ fact made by a single executive officer. See
Ng Fung Ho v. White,259 U.S. 276 [42 8.Ct. 492, 66 L.Ed.
938]. " But the jurisdiction to determine these issues was
expressly limited as follows: "It is not appropriate for us
to pass on such constitutional questions in this habeas corpuS
case if, as the California attorney genera] contends, there is
a state remedy by mandamus available to petitioner under
which he can invoke judicial action to compel the warden to
initiate judicial proceedings, and in which mandamus proceedings the court will hear and consider evidence to determine whether there is 'reason to believe' that the petitioner
is insane. "
After an analysis of the California statutes and decisions,
the writ of certiorari was dismissed with a reference to In re
Phyle, supra, which it was said, held "that neither habeas
corpus nor any other remedy is available to test sanity of a
condemned defendant, except the remedy under section 8701
which only the warden can institute. Hence, 80 far as here
appears, mandamus to compel action by the warden is the
only available remedy." And the court concluded: " We
cannot say at this time that California's remedy by mandamus
will be less than a substantial equivalent of one which authorized him to apply directly to a court for fun hearing '..•
[and] in this situation we find no federal constitutional question presented which is ripe for decision here." Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion likewise viewed the situation as one of local procedure: "The Court now finds that
all that the California Supreme Court did was to hold that
as a matter of California procedure the petitioner's claim
could not be passed on by the direct remedy of habeas corpus,
but that there is available a special local remedy, labeled
mandamus, whereby the petitioner can judiciaUy fest his present sanity." (Emphasis added.) Otherwise stated, certiorari
was granted because Phyle claimed he was to be executed after
a determination as to his sanity by a hospital superintendent
with no further proceeding open to him, and the court dismissed the writ when it appeared that there is a way whereby
"ne in his position may continue to press the right to prove
present insanity and obtain a judicial determination of the
question.
As indicated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, it
is clear that the claim which must be subject to judicial
review is "present sanity"; it is presently that Phyle is to
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be executed, and it is only his threatened execution whi •
could compel a judicial hearing.
;~~
However, Phyle's counsel insists that the Supreme Couby its opinion, has directed this court to review the determi
nation by the hospital superintendent, which was the questio'
decided in the habeas corpus appeal. The argument whoU,
ignores the issues here involved. In neither opinion in ,
Supreme Court is there any holding or implication that Phyl
is entitled to a trial by jury 88 a matter of right for th',
purpose of reviewing the finding of the hospital superintend
ent concerning restoration to sanity. In the ease of In '
Phyle, 80 Cal.2d 838 [186 P.2d 134], this court determine<t
that the law of California does not give one a right to su~
a review, and the United States Supreme Court, in analyzing
itS decision in Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 898 [18 S.Ct. 87,
42 L.Ed. '515], rejected the argument that there is a right
a trial by jury under such circumstances. It said: "A con~
demned defendant cannot automatically block execution by,
suggestions of insanity, and . . . a state tribunal, particularly"
a judge, must be left free to exercise a reasonable discretion,
in determining whether the facts warrant a full inquiry and
hearing upon the sanity of a person sentenced to death."
Assuming, therefore, that due process of law requires .'
judicial hearing upon the issue of present sanity of a person'
condemned to execution, this proceeding in mandate accords ~
Phyle such hearing. By it, he has been given a judicial determination upon the only issue he could properly raise, and it,
is significant that the judgment is not challenged upon the
ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to suPPort it.
In addition to the points presented in the brief, at the oral,
argument counsel for Phyle argued that the law of California .
requires a trial by jury in a proceeding brought to compel '.
the warden to initiate a hearing on the issue of a prisoner'.'
sanity in accordance with the provisions of section 8701 of
the Penal Code. Section 7 of article I of the California Con- "
stitution provides; "The right to trial by jury shall be
lIecured to all. and remain inviolate." That right. however.
is only such as existed at common law. (Pomeroy v. CollIns,
J98 Cal. 46 1243 P. 657] ; People v. Powell, 87 Cal. 348 f25
P. 481, 11 L.R.A. 75]: People v. Bruneman, 4 Cal.App.2d
75 140 P.2d 8911; Estate of Escover, 108 CalApp. 697 [292
P. 1671; Gregory v. Heeke. 73 Cal.App. 268 (238 P 7871.)
It has always been held in this state that the right of jU1'1
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tria] does not extend to special proceedings (VaUejo elc. B.B.
Co. v. Reed Orchard Co., 169 Cal. 545 (147 P. 238]), and
mandate, being a special proceeding, is not subject to the
constitutional requirement (Hutchison v. Reclamation District
No. 1619, 81 Cal.App. 427 [254 P. 606]), although the Legislature bas provided that, where the answer raises a question
of fact as to an essential matter, "the court may, in its discretion, order the question to be tried before a jury." (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1090.)
In the present case, Phyle did not request the eourt to
submit any issue raised by the petition to a jury, nor, bad
such request been made, would it have compelled an affirmative ruling because a trial by jury of issues of fact in a mandate proceeding is wholly within the sound discretion of the
trial judge. Instead of making such a request, Phyle's counsel
placed themselves in the rather anomalous position of petitioning for a writ of mandate and then demanding that the
writ issue asa matter of right without otfering any evidence
whatever.
At the outset of the trial, counsel for Phyle said, "I might:
state our position. I do not wish to otfer any evidence at this .
time. I do not think it is the proper time to otfer evidence."
After a discussion of the opinion in the prior proceedings
brought by Phyle, the trial judge asked: .. Are you going to
submit any evidence or is this argument' As I understand it
at the present time on this petition for mandate, all you are
asking is that the Warden of the State Prison certify that he
believes the defendant to be insane." Following counsel's
affirmative reply, the court continued: "Therefore, as ..•
he has refused to certify, we can take evidence to determine
whether or not there is reasonable ground for the Warden's
opinion, that is as far as this writ is concerned. If you wish
to present evidence, you may." This otfer was declined by
counsel who stated: "I don't believe any evidence is necessary your honor."
But the attorney general insisted upon the presentation of
evidence. He said: "If your Honor please, because of the
gravity of the matter, before I would be wilJing to close the I
book on it, I would want the Warden to take the stand and,
have him give the reasons that impel him to the conclusion
that he has reached." Counsel for Phyle again stated bis
position that the issue before thE' court for decision was one!
of law: "I think what is before this Court [apparently refer~
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ring to the prior judgment declaring Phyle insane which w.. ;
mentioned but never offered in evidence] is res adjudicata aa:~
to the question of insanity-eertainly at that time." It ia~
clear, therefore, that counsel was acting on the assumption,
that by this proceeding in mandate, the question as to Phyle ~
insanity as of December, 1945, and January, 1946, was being
opened up, and throughout the entire mandate proceedings, he,
refused to meet the issue of present sanity as the subject of,
inquiry.
.~.
Although there was no evidence offered by Phyle to support .
the petition for the writ, the court heard witnesses called by,
the attorney general and cross-examined by counsel for peti-;
tioner. Finally, two witnesses testified for Phyle. Ther~fore,'
notwithstanding the theory followed by petitioner's counsel•• '
full and fair hearing was held upon the issue of Phyle's sanity· '
at that time.
The record has been examined and discloses that the find- :
ings of the trial court are fully supported by the evidence.
Warden Duffy appeared as a witness and testified that he had
visited Phyle on a number of occasions; it was his opinion
that Phyle was presently sane, and there was no reason he
knew of to believe that Phyle was insane. This conclusion, he
stated, he reached upon the basis not only of his personal
. observation, but also from reports from six different psychiatrists, all of whom had examined Phyle and found him sane.
Two of these six psychiatrists were called as expert witnesses
by respondent, and each testified that, in his opinion, Phyle
was sane. They both reported that Phyle knew he was in San
Quentin convicted of the murder of Frazee, knew he was under
judgment of death, knew that his execution had been stayed
by the mandate proceeding, was conversant with the facts of
his original trial, and was not suffering from any hallucinations or delusions.
.
One of these experts was Dr. Walter Rappaport, the hospital superintendent who issued the certificate of restoration
to sanity after the judgment entered upon the verdict of a
jury to the contrary. Upon cross-examination, Dr. Rappaport
explained that shortly after Phyle's commitment to the hospital, he "told me very frankly he had faked the whole thing
and he was surprised that Dr. Schmidt [the prison psychiatrist] was fooled but not surprised that he fooled the warden.
. . . He said other prisoners conducted examinations and that
naturally if they are friendly and want to help you they would
"-

.
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indicate to you what you should say and what the &n8Wer
should be. He was very frank."
At this point, counsel for petitioner called Dr. David G.
Schmidt, the prison psychiatrist, who testified that, although
at one time he had been convinced that Phyle was insane, he
was presently certain of Phyle's sanity. This testimony was
unshaken in spite of severe cross-examination.
Mrs. Anna Phyle, the petitioner and mother of Phyle, then
testified. The most direct testimony she gave was that, after
his return from the war, her son acted queerly and she
4'couldn't figure him out •.. he was almost violent [and ahe]
was really afraid of him." She then stated that "he was
improved some but when he 'left and committed this enms, he
was not in his right mind, he was mentally sick." (Emphasis
added.) Such testimony falls far short of a compelling reason
for a conclusion of present insanity.
The record, therefore, fully supports the determination that
the warden "does not have, nor is there any good reason to
believe that said William Jerome Phyle has become· insane
or is presently insane." In such circumstances, the trial judge
could not have done other than discharge the alternative writ.
Whatever may have been Phyle's mental condition at other
times, the legislative concern expressed in section 1367 of the
Penal Code is that the state shall not execute a person who
is insane. The United States Supreme Court indicated that
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
• hearing upon that question when it is properly presented
for consideration. Phyle was afforded the opportunity to
•• judicially test his present sanity" and no legal ground has
been shown for disturbing the finding adverse to him.
In order that there be no misunderstanding as to the scope
of this holding (see Young v. Ragen, 334 U.S. 810 [68 S.Ct.
1013, 92 L.Ed. 1742], following Lofttu v. Illinois, 334 U.S.
804 [68 S.Ot. 1212, 92 L.Ed. 1737]), the law of California,
as it has heretofore been stated, is as follows: The ease of
In re Phyle, 30 Cal.2d 838 [186 P.2d 134], held that "there
is no authority . . . for the proposition that [a condemnt'd]
defendant has a right to habeas corpus or other judicial proceeding to determine the question of his sanity after bis
release from the state hospital." The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari, hut later dismissed the writ upon
procedural grounds intimating that due process of law requires some sort of judicial hearing upon the issue of the
.~
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-present sanlty of a person uuder sentence of death. (PAyle~'
Duffy, 334 U.S. 431 [68 S.Ct. 1181,92 L.Ed. 1494].) Becaue
of the insistence of the attorney general that mandate is aU
available remedy. the court found "no federal constitutional
.question ripe for decision." Otherwise stated, until Phyle"
,jinally and unequivocally denied a judicial hearing in an:i
form, a determination as to whether there is a constitutional
right to such a bearing would be premature.
After that case was decided, the claim of insanity made 011
.behalf of one Eggers, then under sentence of death, came l4)
this court by·.all appeal from a denial of • writ of manda~~'
,by the trial court. The remedy of mandate was utilized..,.
compel the warden to bring Eggers before a jury for a deter'}
,mination as to his sanity under tht' procedure specified by.
section 3701 of the Penal Code. The judgment denying the
writ was affirmed (Williatnl v. Duffy, 82 Cal.2d 578 [197 P.2d:
341 J) but without any express determination that mandateis an available remedy. Certain statements made in deciding'
Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431 [68 8.Ot. 1131, 92 L.Ed. 1494],;
seemed to indicate that there was some question as to the .
soundness of the conclusion of this court in the first Phyle
case (lft.re PAlIZe, 30 Cal.2d 838 [186 P.2d 134]). Because of
this uncertain situation, tllis court, in deciding Williams v.
Duffy, fttpra, 88$umed the necessity of the remedy and coneluded, upon the merits, that the evidence was insufficient to '
show any good reason to believe Eggers was insane. The deci-,
mon in the present case has the same basis, for the record
includes no evidence tending to show any reasonable foundation for a belief that PhyJe is insane.
If, therefore, it is assumed that due process of law requires
.. judicial inquiry concerning the .issue as to aanity, neeesfJarily the conclusion reached in the decision of 1ft. re PAyle,
"pra, is incorrect, and the question for determination here
would concern the remedy or remedies available to a person
in Phyle's r.osition. In turn, the particular relief sought by
Phyle would be the decisive factor.
The normal method of reviewing the legality of a prisoner'.
detention is by writ of habeas corpus. (Pen. Code, § 1473;
1ft. re BeZl, 19 Ca1.2d 488 (122 P.2d 22] j 13 Cal.Jur. 216 j
cf. Loftus v. IUift.Dis, 334 U.S. 804 [68 S.Ot. 1212, 92 L.Ed.
1737]), and where habeas corpus is available and adequate
it is the exclusive remedy and mandate will be denied. (Irvine
v. Gib.~on, 1~ Cal.2d 14 [118 P.2d 812J; Boss v. O'Brien,
1 Cal.App. 2:.1496 [36 P.2d 1108J.) Certainly, in the absence
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of a particular statutory remedy, the procedure of habeas
corpus would satisfy any assumed requirement of judicial
hearing upon the issue of the present sanity of a condemned
prisoner.
However, section 8701 of the Penal Code provides that
where there is good reason to believe a condemned priSoner is
insane the warden mtuf institute a proceeding directed to
obtaining a jury trial of the issue of his sanity. Due process
does not require such a trial. (PhyZe v. Duffy, 834 U.S. 431
[68 s.Ot. 1131, 92 L.Ed. 1494] ; Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S.
398 [18 S.Ot. 87,42 L.Ed. 515].) Its basis is entirely statutory,
and the determination by a jury may be obtained only when
the proceeding is instituted by the warden. Mandate is the
proper remedy to compel a public officer to perform an official
duty, and it may be had not only upon a failure to exercise
a duty but also wherc the officer's refusal to do so constitutes
an abuse of discretion. (McClatchy Newspapers v. 8uperior
Court,26 Cal.2d 386, 394 [159 P.2d 944].)
Where a prisoner seeks to invoke the statutory remedy
provided by section 3701 of the Penal Code, mandate is the
only available proceeding. Thus, upon the assumption that
any judicial hearing as to sanity must be afforded one under
sentence of death, there are two remedies, each directed to an
exclusive form of relief. To acquire a simple judicial determination of the fact of sanity, habeas corpus is the proper
and exclusive remedy. But to obtain a jury trial of that issue,
as provided by section 8701 of the Penal Code, mandate is the
only available and adequate remedy. As stated by Mr. Justice
Black: ccIn view of this mandatory obligation [under Pen.
Code, § 8701] upon the warden to initiate proceedings if
'there is good reason to believe' a defendant sentenced to
death is insane, it would be somewhat anomalous, to say the
least, if California courts were wholly without power to correct an executive agent's abuse of authority in a matter of
such significance as the execution of insane persons." (Phllle
v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431 [68 S.Ot.1131, 1135-36, 92 L.Ed.1494].)
Throughout the habeas corpus proceedings and the one
now under review, Phyle has sought only a jury trial. To
ohtain such relief, his proper remedy, if any is available, is
the proceeding for mandate here under review. But upon the
application for the writ itself he is not entitled to a trial by
jury; only when he has obtained the writ may he have such
a trial, and having failed to show any "good reason" why
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the warden should initiate an inquiry, the judgment denying
the remedy allowed by section 3701 of the Penal Code must
be affirmed.
•
It is so ordered.
Gibson, O. J., and Shenk, J., concurred.
TRA YNOR, J .-1 concur in the judgment.
Petitioner contends. that under the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Phyle v. Dully, 334 U.S. 431 168
S.Ot. 1131,92 L.Ed. 1494], he is entitled to the judicial bear-.
ing that this court bas denied h i m . : .
Neither that decision nor any provision of the United States
Constitution gives petitioner the right to an initial judicial.
determination of his restoration to sanity or to a judicial review of an administrative determination thereof. The statutes
of this state, as construed in In
Ph.yl., 300al.2d 838 1186
P.2d 134], preclude both a judicial hearing and judicial review. This court there held that in Penal Code, sections 37003704, the Legislature bas prescribed the exclusive method by
which the sanity or the restoration to sanity of one condemned
to death who subsequently becomes insane may be determined.
Penal Code, section 3704, provides that" {w]hen the defendant recovers bis reason, the superintendent of such hospital
must certify that fact to the Governor, who must thereupon
issue to the warden his warrant appointing a day for the execution of the judgment. . . ." The court held that the deter. '.
mination by the hospital superintendent prescribed by the
statute was not subject to judicial review by habeas corpus
or otherwise. It invoked the provision of Penal Code, section
3700, that "No judge, court, or officer, other than the Governor, can suspend the execution of a judgment of death,
except the warden of thf' State prison to whom he is delivered
for execution . . . unless an appeal is taken." Petitioner 'a
appeal had previously been determined (28 Cal.2d 671 [171
P.2d 428]) and his conviction had become final. A judicial
~view of the hospital superintendent's determination would
compel suspension of the execution of the judgment, contrary
to the express terms of section 3700.
Gardn.r v. JOMS, 126 Oal. 614 [59 P. 126], and In
Buchanan, 129 Cal. 330 [61 P. 1120, 50 L.R.A. 378], are not
applicable here. Those cases determined that a person held
in a state hospital as insane could properly bring habeas
corpus to compel the superintendent to release him as cured;
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habeas corpus always lies at the petition of one unlawfully
restrained of his liberty. (Pen. Code, § 1473.) They are not
authority for the converse proposition that a person found
sane and released from a hospital may maintain an action
of habeas corpus to prove himself insane and thus gain readmission to the hospital. Petitioner was released from the
state hospital because he was found sane. He would have gone
free had he not been detained by respondent by virtue of a
final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. (Pen.
Code, § 1486[2].) He would have gone free had he not been
convicted of murder, and there can be no doubt that he could
not invoke habeas corpus to return to the hospital. He cannot
invoke it now to escape the execution of the judgment. The
intervention of the judgment has no bearing on the question
of his sanity; it does not give him a right to habeas corpus
to get back into the hospital that he otherwise would not have.
Petitioner contended that the California procedure as thus
interpreted would deprive him of his life without due process
of law, and on that ground he petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The court granted
the petition to determine whether there was any merit in this
contention. (333 U.S. 841 [68 St.Ct. 656, 92 L.Ed. 1125].) In
granting certiorari, the court did not decide, as petitioner
concludes, that the Fourteenth Amendment would be violated
by a conclusive administrative adjudication that his sanity
had been restored. It agreed merely to consider the question,
but found it unnecessary to decide it because of the deputy
attorney general's statement that under California procedure
a judicial remedy was available to petitioner. Mr. Justice
Black, speaking for the majority, stated: "It is not appropriate for us to pass on such constitutional questions in this
habeas corpus case if . . . there is a state remedy by mandamus available to petitioner under which he can invoke
judicial action to compel the warden to initiate judicial proceedings, and in which mandamus proceedings the court will
hear and consider evidence to determine whether there is
'reason to believe' that the petitioner is insane." (PhyZe v.
Duffy, 334 U.S. 431 [68 S.Ct. 1131, 1135, 92 L.Ed. 1494].)
This eourt, however, did not limit itself in 1. re PhyZe,
supra, to holding that habeas corpus was not the proper
remedy, or even to holding that there could be no judieial
review of the superintendent's determination. It held unequivocally that there eould be no judicial review under Cali-
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fornia procedure and that petitioner's right to a judicial hear
ing depended solely upon whether the warden believed th8.
he was insane. (30 Cal.2d 838, 847 [186 P.2d 134].) The
reasons for holding that there can be no judicial review ~.
the superintendent's determination likewise preclude issuan~
of mandamus to compel action by the warden. The decisi~,
of this court in Williams v. Dully, 82 Cal.2d 578 [197 P.2cl
341], does not compel a contrary conclusion. In that ca8¢.
the court, proceeding on the assumption· that mandamus w~,
a proper remedy, held only that the petitioner therein did n··.
present a sufficient case for the issuance of a peremptory wri
Penal Code, section 3700, precludes the suspension of.~,
execution of the judgment by mandamus just as it precludt!
its suspension by habeas corpus. This statute prohibits 8.DJ:
judicial intervention unless initiated by the warden of th~,
state prison. In the absence of a holding by the United Sta
Supreme Court that this statute is unconstitutional, I do not
believe that this court should countenance the use of man;.
damus to defeat its clearly stated purpose.
:~
It bears emphasis that section 8700 presupposes a valid.
judgment of death after a trial that has met all the requi~';
ments of due process of law. Then and only then is it operative; it would not be constitutional otherwise. It does not
preclude attack upon the judgment itself by habeas corpus,";
coram nobis, or any other appropriate proceeding. In th~
present case there is no question of the validity of the judgment.
.,':,.
Petitioner contends that the procedure the Legislature has.
prescribed for determining his restoration to sanity would
deprive him of his life without due process of law. Petitioner"
is to be deprived of his life, not because an administrative,
officer has found him sane, but because a jury has duly found ..
him guilty of murder in the first degree. Petitioner does not
claim to have been insane at the time he committed the offense' .
or unable to assist in his own defense because of insanity at .
the time of trial. He relies on the accidental intervention of "
insanity after trial and conviction as a basis for a right under: .'
the Fourteenth Amendment to have the execution of the judgment suspended pending a forma] judicial determination, He
contends that this right is so, ext~nsive tJ.1at th~ state is pow~r- ·.1··..
less to leave the final determmation of hIS samty to an admin- .'
istrative officer.
Taking refuge in insanity as a means of escaping execution 1
is not a cOnstitutional right, but a privilege that the state has I,
'j
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conferred as an act of mercy or special dispensation. All the
United States Supreme Court stated in Nobles v. Georg1a,
168 U.S. 398,407 [18 S.Ct.. 87, 42 L.Ed. 515]: "The plea at
this stage is only an appeal to the humanity of the court to
postpone the punishment until recovery takes place, or as a
merciful dispensation. The rights of the prisoner as an offender on trial for an offense are not involved. He has had
the benefit of a jury trial, and it is now the court, only, which
must be satisfied on the score of humanity." (Accord: People
v. Knott, 122 Cal. 410 [55 P. 154] j Spann v. 8tate. 47 Ga.
649 j Davidson v. Commonwealth, 174 Ky. 789 [192 S.W. 846];
Laros v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa.St.200 j 8tate ex reI. Al/ani v.
8uperior Court, 139 Wash. 125 [245 P. 929].) Recognizing
that the suspension of execution on the ground of intervening
insanity is a privilege granted by the state, and not a fundamental right of the defendant, at least 15 states- bavp dispensed with a formal judicial hearing upon the issue; others
have provided merely for an informal inquiry that need
satisfy only the trial judge of the defendant's sanity. Georgia,
whose summary procedure was upheld in Nobles v. Georgia,
lUpt'a, 168 U.S. 398, has repealed the statutes there questioned,
and now provides no method by which the claim of intervening
insanity may be raised. (Cnob v. Parker, 119 Ga. 29R 146
S.E.llO].) Even in states in which the determination is made
by the trial judge, the proceeding is not regarded as judicial
in nature. "The appointment of the commission and the investigation made by them was not deemed or intended to be
a trial in any sense of the word. It was simply, in our judgment, the proper exercise of a discretionary power." (8tate
v. Nordstrom, 21 Wash. 403, 409 [58P. 248].) It has been
held proper for the state to make the decision of the initia1
arbiter final, expressly precluding any judicial review thpreof.
(Webber v. Commonwealth, 119 Pa.St. 223 [13 A. 4271 ; Darnell v. 8tate, (Tex.Cr.) 5 S.W. 522 j State v. Nordstrom. 21
Wash. 403 [58 P. 248] ; see cases collected in 49 A.L.R. ~04,)
There has been wide recognition of the value of de)egatinll
decisions of this kind t.o administrative expertR The Briti",h
Criminal Lunatics Act, for example, providp~ (47 and 48 Vir.t ..
ch. 64) that a person u • • . ceases to be a I'riminal hmatic
(1) if he is remitted to prison by a warrant of the RpC'rPtary
• Arizona, CaliforniR, Tdnho. MissiAlIippi. Mi".Ol1r1. Montnnn. Nf'h"A~ka.

New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, Virrinia,
"',ominr.

)
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of State issued upon a certificate from two medical pract1
tioners that he is sane. . . . " (26 Halsbury's Laws of Eng~
land 207.) The official draft of the proposed Code of Criminal
Procedure of the American Law Institute makes provisioD
(§§ 409.12) for a procedure similar to that estabHshedby.
the Penal Code. Section 412 of the American Law Institute'
Code provides for the commitment to an institution of
person under sentence of death who has been found to ~
insane. It then provides that" [I]f thereafter the proper
officer of such institution is of the opinion that the defendant
is sane he shall report this fact to the governor, whereupon
the governor shall appoint a commission consisting of two
competent disinterested physicians to determine whether the'
defendant has been restored to sanity. . . . If, after the'
report of the commission, the governor decides that the defendant has been restored to sanity, he ahall cause the defendant to be returned to the custody of the - - (officer in charge
of the prison to which the defendant has been committed)
and shall issue a warrant to the - - - directing him to
execute the sentence at a time designated in such warrant."
(Amer. Law Institute, Code of Criminal Procedure, § 412.)
Under none of these provisions has it been deemed necessary
or desirable that the defendant be accorded a judicial hearing
or that his" right to insanity" be safeguarded against ex parte
determination by appropriate administrative officials. (See,
also, People v. Sloper, 198 Cal. 601 [246 P. 802]; People v.
Eldred, 103 Colo. 334 [86 P.2d 248]; Bingkam v. State, 82
Okla.Cr. 305 [169 P.2d 311] ; State v. Nordstrom, 21 Wash.
403 [58 P. 248].)
The reason ordinarily advanced against executing a man
who has become insane since judgment is that he might, if
sane, recall something in stay of execution. (See 4 Blackstone,
Commentaries (Jones ed.), p. 25.) Can this reason serve as
a basis for a constitutional right not to be executed while
insane' The possibility that a defendant, sane at the time of
his trial, will recall some fact in stay of execution after a
period of intervening insanity is remote. The reasoning that
would establish a constitutional right to delay on this basis
would also serve to postpone the execution of a sane man on
the ground that a witness IQight conceivably be discovered
thereafter whose testimony might save him. If the possibility
of a subsequently refreshed memory were enough to prevent
the execution of an insane man, it would also render unconstitutional any capital punishment, since it is possible to

a
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speculate endlessly about the possibilities that would rescue
a condemned man from execution provided it were delayt>d
long enough.
Those who would delay capital punishment by questioning
the finality of an administrative determination of sanity may
in reality be concernE'd with the finality of capital punishment
itself. Is it not an inverted humanitarianism that deplores
as barbarous the capital punishment of those who have become
insane after trial and conviction, but accepts the capital
punishment of sane men, a curious reasoning that would free
a man from capital punishment only if be is not in full possession of his senses'
Petitioner can claim at most a privilege, not a constitutional
right. The Legislature bas qualified this privilege by the condition that the administrative determination of sanity is not
subject to judicial review; it has done so to prevent abuses
of the privilege to secure delay. It is now contended, however,
that the Legislature cannot thus qualify the privilege it bas
granted; that when the determination of the fact is a matter
of life or death, it cannot be left to the ex parte unreviewable
decision of an administrative officer.
The misleading implication is that petitioner is condemned
by an administrative determination of his sanity. His lift' was
forfeit when a jury found him guilty of first degree murdE'r.
His temporary release from punishment was a reprieve, not
an absolution. His plea is now but to the mercy of the state.
The Legislature can properly leave to an administrative
officer the final determination as to whether a condition (,Dsta
that justifies extending a privilege. (United States ere reI.
Johnson v. Shaughnessy, 336 U.S. 806 [69 S.Ct.921, 93
L.Ed. - ] ; St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298
U.S. 38, 77 [56 8.Ot. 720, 80 L.Ed. 10331 : Dismuke v. United
States, 297 U.S. 167, 171-172 f56 S.Ct. 400, 80 L.Ed. 561];
Work v. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 182 [45 S.Ct. 252, 69 L.Ed. 561];
United States v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 331 [39 S.Ct. 464, 63
L.Ed. 1011] ; United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 261-262
{25 8.Ot; 644, 49 L.Ed. 1040]; Carmichael v. Delaney, 170
F.2d 239, 243-244; United States ere rel. Medeiros v. Watkins,
166 F.2d 897, 899; United States ere reZ. Lapides v. Watkins,
165 F.2d 1017.) When there is merely a question of the regulation of a privilege, the validity of final administrative decisions under the due process clause does not require that notice
or hearing be given. (Oceanic Steam Na1). Co. v. Stranaha-n,

/
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214 U.S. 320-338 [29 S.Ot. 671, 53 L.Ed. 1013]; Perkins
Lukens Steel 00.,310 U.S. 113 [60 S.Ot. 869,84 L.Ed. 110S-U
Origet v. Hedden, 155 U.S. 228 [15 S.Ct. 92,39 L.Ed. 130)';
Passavant & 00. v. United States, 148 U.S. 214 [13 S.Ot. 5;2,
87 L.Ed. 426] ; Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. (U.S.) 497 110
L.Ed. 559]; United States v. Ju T01J, 198 U.S. 253, 261-262
[25 S.Ct. 644,49 L.Ed. 1 0 4 0 ] . ) ;
The present case is analogous to those involving indeter-;
minate sentence laws that give administrative agencies exclu-:
sive power to reduce the maximum sentences imposed by law.'
Upon conviction the defendant forfeits his liberty for th,e
maximum term specified by statute. Thereafter the apprO::,
priate administrative body may reduce the sentence if it sees
fit. These statutes, which allow the defendant 'sliberty to turn
on the ex parte unreviewable decision of administrative ofli-'
cers, have been uniformly upheld on the ground that they"
violate no provision of the United States Constitution. (Ugh-"
banks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481 [28 S.Ct. 372, 52 L.Ed.
582]; Dreyer v. 1Ui~ois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 [23 S.Ct. 28, 47
L.Ed 79]; United States v. Ragen, 159 F.2d 356, cert. den.
331 U.S. 823 [67 S.Ot. 1311, 91 L.Ed. 1839] ; People v. Oonnors, 291 Ill. 614 [126 N.E. 595], d'd, 260 U.S. 695 [43
S.Ot. 11, 67 L.Ed. 468] ; see also In re Byrnes, 32 Oal.2d 843,
850 [198 P.2d 685].) Otherwise it would be unconstitutional
to give to the governor of the state the power to commute ,
sentences. Here again the question of life or death turns OD
the unreviewable decision of a single nonjudicial oflicer; yet'
it has never been suggested that his decisions are subject to
judicial review. Executive clemency is recognized as an act
of mercy. Granting of the privilege of not being executed to
one who is insane is likewise an act of mercy. Considerations '
may be presented to the governor for stay of execution or commutation of sentence that constitute much stronger grounds
for mercy than intervening insanity; there may be strong
doubts as to defendant's very guilt, or mitigating circumstances that do not warrant judicial intervention but carry a
strong appeal to executive clemency. Yet the governor's determination is 1inal even though it maybe adverse to the petitioner. It follows that unless the Constitution itself prohibits
the executioD of a man who has become insane since judgment,
the Legislature may well leave to the warden the final determination as to whether there is reason to believe he is insane.
The procedure provided by sections 3700-3704 of tb{' Penal
Code to determine when execution shall be stayed because of
j
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defendant's intervening insanity is closely akin to that ap·
proved by the United States Supreme Court in Nobles v.
Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 [18 S.Ct. 87, 42 L.Ed. 515]. Under
that procedure also the determination of whether there was
reason to believe defendant insane was left to the ex parte
determination of a single state officer. and there was no bear.
ing on the question. The court held that due process did not
require the granting of bearing on this issue when a state
judge had determined after an ex parte examination of the
defendant that there was no reason to believe that defendant
was insane. It has been suggested that the Georgia procedure
was sustained because a judge ruled· on the question of fact.
As at common law, the person given the discretionary author·
ity was the trial judge, but it is clear, however, that he acted
much in the manner of an administrative official or board.
"It is rather a perversion of terms to call an inquisition of
this kind the act of a court and to exercise in reference to it
the writ of certiorari. The whole proceeding is rather an
inquiry based on public propriety and decency, than a mattE'r
of right.•.. " (Spann v. 8tate, 47 Ga. 549, 551. See, also,
Baughn v. State, 100 Ga. 554 [28 S.E. 68, 38 L.R.A. 577],
d'd in Nobles v. Georgia, and Car,. v. State, 98 Ga. 89 [27
S.E. 148], holding that under the law of Georgia the decision
was not appealable.) It is settled, moreover, that the doctrine
of separation of powers under the United States Constitution,
which requires that certain issues of law or fact be decided
by the judicial branch in the federal government, has no
application to the states. (Cla1oorne County v. Brooks, 111
U.S. 400, 410 [48 S.Ot. 489, 28 L.Ed. 470] ; Carler v. Caldwell,
200 U.S. 293, 297 [26 S.Ct. 264, 50 L.Ed. 488] ; Consolidated
Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541, 552 [28 S.Ct. 178,
52 L.Ed. 827] ; Reetz v.Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 507 [23 S.Ct.
890, 47 L.Ed. 563]; Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 [23
S.Ct. 28, 47 L.Ed. 79].) There is nothing in the United
States Constitution requiring states to delegate to one branch
rather than another the decision on a question of fact. If due
process requires notice and hearing, those requirements must
be met whether the question is to be decided by a judge or
an administrative officer. (Honeyman v. Hanan, 302 U.S. 375,
878 [58 S.Ct. 273, 82 L.Ed. 312]; Gellert v. National City
Bank 01 New York, 313 U.S. 221. 235 r61 S.Ct. 898. 85 L.Ed.
l299, 133 A.L.R. 1467].) If due process does not require
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notice and hearing, it is immaterial whether the ex p8r~
determination is made by a judge or a nonjudicial offic{'r ~i:.
the government. Accordingly, the approval of the ex part:'
determination of a judge in the Nobles case by the {Tnil.·'
States Supreme Court would seem to be directed at the vali(l
ity of the determination itself, not at the fact that it w
made by a judge.
t.
Petitioner had the benefit of independent determinations n
his sanity by the hospital superintendent and by the warden
The Legislature is entitled to rely upon a presumption tha
these administrative and executive officers will act honest
and in good faith. There is no reason to believe that a jud
could do more.
('~:
Petitioner contends, however, that since his insanity w'
initially determined by a jury in a judicial hearing, that adju
dication gave him a vested right to be considered insane
He contends that either the judgment should continue in for
or there should be proceedings in a court of competent j .
diction to annul it or to supersede it with one of equal an
later authority. This contention attributes to that adjudica
tion a conclusiveness that it does not have. The judgment di
not give petitioner a continuing status of insanity that
only be terminated after another judicia] hearing. (Kellog
v. Cochran, 87 Cal. 192, 198 {25 P. 677, 12 L.R.A. 1041
United States v. Halliday, 116 F.2d 812; In re Kassler, 17
Misc. 856 [19 N.Y.S.2d 266] ; Sutton v. Sutton, 222 N.C. 27 .
[22 S.E.2d 553J; Bishop v. Bishop, 40 Ohio App. 493 [17
N.E. 142J.) The order of commitment stated only that th
petitioner was then insane, and, pursuant to Penal Cod .
section 3704, provided expressly "when said William JeroID.
Phyle recovers his reason, that the Superintendent of th j
State Hospital in which he is confined certify that fact to the
Governor of the State of California for further proceedin~
as is required by law." The order by its terms recognizes tha~
petitioner was to be confined in the hospital only until the
superintendent certified that he had recovered his rt'asorJ
When that certification is made, the order of commitment
and the judgment of insanity no longer bar bis recommitmen~
to prison. When a statute such as section 3704 provides that:
the authorities of an institution shall discharge an inmate:
upon their determination that he is sane, such a discharge:
restores the person to a status of sanity. (Kellogg v. Cochran,
87 Cal. 192, 198 [25 P. 677, 12 L.R.A. 1041: Shaw v. Peehan,
207 Cal. 561 [279 P. 658] ; People ex rel. Guiseppi v. Tka1l"'~,
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242 N.Y.S. 293; State ex ret. Connur v. Lanmeck, 133 Ohio St.
257 ~13 N.E.2d 127 J ; see Smoot, Law of Insanity, § 168, p. 128
and American Law Institute, Code of Criminal Procedure,
§ 412.) The hospital superintendent acted pursuant to the
statute and the order of commitment; 1t cannot reasonably
be held that this order precluded his making the determination
it prescribed.
This court is here concerned, not with the wisdom of capital
punishment or of the statutory procedure attendant upon it,
but solely with the validity of that procedure. I t may nevertheless be noted that there is sound reason underlying Penal
Code, section 3700, so long as capital punishment is authorized in this state. If a defendant condemned to death under
a valid judgment is allowed recourse to the courts as a matter
of right upon his claim to be insane, he may secure an interminable reprieve merely by alleging that he is insane. Even
after he is adjudged sane following hearing and appeal, he
can allege that he has since become insane. Since the issue
is his present insanity. he can thus set in motion an endless
procession from trial to appeal tQ trial to appeal. Such procedure "would make the punishment of a defendant 'depend
solely upon his fecundity in making suggestion after suggestion of insanity, to be followed by trial upon trial'." (Phyle
v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431 [68 S.Ct. 1131, 1134, 92 L.Ed. 1494].)
If the warden's decision is subject to judicial review, the way
is open for the endless series of trials and appeals that the
Legislature sought to prevent by the enactment of section 3700.
Even if it is assumed that mandamus will lie to review the
warden's determination, the peremptory writ was properly
denied in this ease. Petitioner was in fact, although erroneously, accorded a full judicial hearing on the question
whether there was reason to believe that he was then insane.
As the opinion of Mr. Justice Edmonds sets forth, not only
was there ample evidence to support the judgment, but petitioner presented no evidence that might even serve as a basis
for a contrary conclusion.
Spence, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J., concurring and dissenting.-Now th(' (,Tror
of this court in holding (In re Phyle (1947), 30 Cal.2rl 8:i8
[186 P.2d 134] ) that habt'as corpus was not a\'ailable as against
the ruling of an administrative agent to tPRt th(' sanity of a
person under sentence of death, starts to multiply. Its progeny
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is a new ,rial courtprocedttre (and, originating in a trial
court, it carries a right of appeal) whereby the convicted one
may invoke mandamus, repeatedly and apparently as often
as Gee·asion may arise, to try to compel the warden to exercise
discretion to require the district attorney to file proceedings,
in the trial court, impanel a jury and try anew the question
of the defendant's sanity. All this, notwithstanding that the
warden has already once so acted, that a trial has been had,
• judgment rendered and that the sole question properly to
be raised, within the requirements of due process, is whether.
the original judgment of insanity still is operative. It is still
operative if the defendant remains insane and gives him allthe protection which a new trial and judgment could give him;
but if defendant has recovered his sanity the judgment by
its own terms has expired and defendant should be executed.
As is hereinafter shown habeas corpus is traditionally, and
by earlier decisions of this court, the sole and exclusive remedy
to settle the single issue.
,
In the opinion prepared by Justice Edmonds it is said that
"Where a prisoner seeks to invoke the statutory remedy provided by section 3701 of the Penal Code, mandate is the only
available proceeding. Thus, upon the assumption that any
judicial bearing as to sanity must be afforded one under sentence of death, there are two remedies, each directed to an
exclusive form of relief. To acquire a simple judicial determination of the fact of sanity, habeas corpus is the proper ,
and exclusive remedy. But to obtain a jury trial of that issue,
as provided by section 370] of the Penal Code, mandate is the
only available and adequate remedy." And that proposition
is said to apply here even though defendant has already had
the trial as provided for· by section 3701. Anyone judgment"
in such a case is said to have no continuing eBect because it .
relates only to sanity as or its date and to be immaterial inrespect to the claim as of a later date; hence, regardless of
the outcome of a first sanity trial under sections 370] et
sequitl'lr th(' defendant as of a later date may invoke mandamus seeking to compel another trial on the same issue and
to the same end. Such a procedure bids fair to be a most
useful one for those who would seek unwarranted delays in
the execution of death sentences.
Because of the deplorably confused state in which several
important bl'an~hf'R of thf' law (habeas corpus, mandamus,
coram nobis, due process, suspension of the death penalty, con-
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mct of laws, trial for insanity of a condemned person, comparative powers of administrative agents and courts, etc.) are
left by the present opinion (or lack of one in which a majority
of the court agree), read in conjunction with the majority
opinion of this court in 1", 1'6 Phy" (1947), nIWo, 80 Cal.2d
838, and the opinions of the justices of the United States
Supreme Court in Phyu v. Duffy (1948), 834 U.S. 431 (68
S.Ct. 1131, 92 L.Ed. 1494], one who would seek to follow
the vagaries of the law through the inconsistencies of tbiI
ease, with the object of rescuing as much as poasible of ita
integrity, should both concur and dissent.
I should concur in the judgment denying relief in this pro~eding because: 1. mandamus is not a proper remedy i 2. the
relief sought by mandamus has already been accorded the
petitioner and a valid judgment determining the very issues
sought to be litigated is. presently outstanding;1 8. there is
available (and at all times concerned there has been) the plain,
direct and simple remedy of habeas corpus, expressly provided
by statute to try the only issues which can properly now be
raised (Pen. Code, §§ 1473, 1487(5), 1493). But I shOlild
dissent from the judgment beeause,if the novel soggestion
that habeas corpus is not the proper or the exclusive l'emedy
to try the legality of one'. imprisonment after sentence (particularly the identity of his jailer, Pen. Code, §1487(5» is
to be followed, as the opinion of Justice Edmonds suggests,
and if mandamus is to be sobstituted for habeas corpus or
added as an additional remedy (not to directly determine
the legality of the place of detention or identity of the custodian but to compel a third person administrator to exercise
discretion to initiate proceedings to cause a district attorney
to start proceedings in a trial court to try anew before a
jury as of a new date the question of petitioner's sanity), then
it must follow, if we accord any weight at all to the earlier
verdict of the jury and outstanding judgment of the soperior
court, that as a matter of law there is shown "good reason to
believe that a defendant, under judgment of death, has become
1rfhia ill true unI888 we are to hold that the mere puaage of time
alte,. the iaaues and conaequent!y entitles .. condemned person to repeated
trials in a trial court on the l&IIle iaaues as of .-ell new date he ma;y eelect;
or, if the warden or district attorney neglect to nggeat or institute neb
trials then, b7 the majority opinion, the condemned person, apparen~
as often 8.8 he may ask, is entitled to a trial-1" the tMl courl-"labeled
mandamua," and, if the judgment be advene, to _ app-.l fnm ..aU
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insane" (Pen. Code, § 3701) and the duty of the warden'
would appear to require the reinitiation of the roundabout'
and cumbersome procedures above mentioned.·i,~
A brief statement of the facts is here pertinent. On Feb-·
ruary 20, 1946, William Jerome Phyle was convicted of the'
crime of murder of the first degree and sentenced to death'.
The judgment of conviction was affirmed (People v. Phllle
(1946),28 Ca1.2d 671 [171 P.2d 428]). In December of that
year, in a proceeding duly instituted by the district attorney.,
at the suggestion of the warden of San Quentin Prison under"
the provisions of section 3701 of the Penal Code, a jury found'
that Phyle was insane. Our statute prohibits execution of the
insane (Pen. Code, § 1367). The judgment of the superior
court, following the verdict, determined that Phyle was then
insane and adjudged that he be confined in the state hospital
for the insane "until his reason be restored." Twenty-five
days later (18 days after Phyle's admission to the hospital)
the superintendent of the hospital, without trial or hearing,
without judicial determination that Phyle had become sane,
and without any determination upon any prescribed or ascertainable standard, certified to the governor that Phyle had
recovered his sanity and he was returned to the warden of
the prison for execution. That is to say, the place of Phyle'.
confinement and the identity of his jailer were changed; he ,
was transferred from the custody of the superintendent of
the 'state hospital for the criminal insane to the custody of
the warden of a state prison. If, in truth, Phyle continued
to be insane the judgment of the court required that he be '
kept in the hospital; as long as he remained insane the judgmeni remained effective and his imprisonment in any institution other than the state hospital or by any custodian other
than the hospital superintendent would be unlawful. Phyle
contended that the transfer was unlawful, that his detention
by the warden was unlawful, and that the superintendent of
the hospital remained his lawful custodian. He sought relief
by application for the writ of habeas corpus, alleging the facts
as to the jury trial, the rendition of judgment and his commitment to the hospital. Phllle alleged, and it U/a8 not denied by
the State, that in truth" said PkllZewa8, and still is, insane."
Nevertheless, the majority of this court held that the ruling
of the sole administrative agent (the hospital superintendent),
even though arrived at by no fixed or ascertainable standard,
was supreme; that his ruling, regardless of lack of standard,
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completely and irrevocably terminated the judgment of the
court; that Phyle must be executed on the agent's ruling; and
that neither this court nor any other had jurisdiction to review
the administrative order. (In re Phyle (1947), ,upra,30 Cal.
2d 838;) Thereafter the United States Supreme Court issued
certiorari but on the hearing accepted a statement of the
Attorney General of California to the effect that this court
did not rule that Phyle was entitled to no judicial review of
the administrative agent's order, but held only that habeas
corpus was the wrong remedy and that a procedure "labeled
mandamus" was the proper, and an available, remedy (whe~
ther to review the agent's order or to again try, as of a new
date, the issue of Phyle's sanity, is not entirely dear) and
upon that novel theory dismissed the certiorari proceeding.
(Phyle v. Duffy (1948), aupra, 334 U.S. 431.)
That the attorney general was mistaken in his representation,at least insofar as the intention of this court is concerned,
is known to all of us and is apparent from the language used
by the majority. They declared that (In rePhyle (1947),
supra, 30 Cal.2d 838, 840-8(1) "The only question presented
is whether a person who has been adjudged insane after eonviction, sentence, and delivery to a warden of a state prison
for execution, has the right toa judicial determination of the
question of his restoration to sanity.. . .• [pp. 842-843]
There is no authority . . . for the proposition that defendant
has a right to habeas corpus or other jtulicial proceeding to
determine the question of his sanity after his release from the
state hospital. In fact, section 3700 of the Penal Code eJ:~
pressly prohibits· such a proceeding." (Italics added.) Making their position still more clear, they continued" [po 845]
Where there isa statute that declares that the superintendent
of the state hospital where the prisoner iseon1ined may
'A reading of the ltatute (Pen. Code, .8100) diBe10eea that it dGel!
aot "expr88B1y prohibit [ 1" UI.7 neb proceeding. The eontext of the
ltatement nggests that it Mould be understood as Gf'ptMI&tK'" GIl
ouctoritotem FoestO,,"'" j it argues that eince the court itself may Dot
(it &BIumes or declares .. a premise) IUBpend ezeeutioD iD UI.7 ease but
on appeal, then the power and jurisdiction to review iD UI.7 ease but em
appeal are to be UJlderstood .. ,,,,pliedl)' prohibited. In other words thiB
argument, sweeping aside without comment all coDBtitutional couidera·
tionB of due process (see People v. 8hOf1, (1948), 82 CaL2d 502, 1506
[191 P.2d 330]; JlOtm6)' v. BoZohGA (1935), 294 U.s. 103, 110 [55
S.Ct. 840, 79 L.Ed. 191, 98 A.L.R. 406]; To)'wr v. Alabama (1948),
aa5 U.S. 252 [68 B.Ot. 1415, 92 L.Ed. 1935]) would completely abolish
habeas corpus, OOf'O'" aob.., and all other judicial remedies iD aeath
penalty eaaes, acept appeals from the judgment of eoa'rietiOL
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declare the prisoner's sanity restored,I a pel'Sl)n awaiting ~
ecution has no right to a [po 846J judicial determination of
his restoration to sanity'. . . By adopting section 3700 of the
Penal Code prohibiting the courts from suspending the execu~
tion of judgment of death except on appeal, the LegislatuN
has provided in effect that the courts of this state are without
power [regardleas of constitutional provisionsl, except as pro-.
vided by statute, to determine the 88llity of a person who bu
been sentenced to be executed for a capital offense and is m.
the custody of the warden . . . for the purpose of executi~
•. . Thus. regardleas of what the common law powers of ,.a;
court may be, when the procedure for the determination ~f
the question of sanity of a person who has been sentenced to
death is covered by statute, a court has no inherent power to·
determine that question and such a person has no right to •
judicial determination of the question unless the statutes 10
provide .•. 1p. 847J The question remains whether the
statutory procedure [as interpreted by the majority] for d.:
termining the question of restoration to sanity is constitutional. Petitioner contends that defendant has a right to an
adjudication of the question of his sanity, protected by the
due proceas ('lauses of the Constitution of the United States
and the Constitution of California. There it flO ncA rigA'
.nder either Oonstitution (italics added] •••
"[p.849] The petitioner contends also that the separation
of powers provision of section 1 of article III of the California
Constitution is violated by leaving the final determination of
• prisoner's sanity to administrative officers ••• [po 850]
Even if it be assumed that the power of the superintendent
of the state hospital. to whom defendant was delivered, to
determine whether defendant bas recovered his reason is •
judicial power, the foregoing provisions of the California Constitution authorize the delegation of this power. Under the
statutes the prisoner is delivered to the custody of the superintendent as a person convicted of a felony. and thereafter,
10 far aathe superintendent '8 authority over such a person
is concerned the superintendent exercises not only the authority of an officer entrusted with the superintendence of an
-oar ltatute purports onlJ to authorize the lIlJIerintendent to declare
the fact when it haa been ill aome way 1)revioualy ueenailled and deterJDiDed; certaiDly it does Dot expresaly, and there ia at least grave doubt
that it does impliedlJ, authorize the Illperintendent to himself determine
the fact; nol' dOO8 it establish any standard by whieb the determillatioD i
IIhall be made b7 lOut or layman. (See Pea. Oocle, It 8701-1704.)
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institution for convicted felons but the duties and fnnctiona
prescribed in Penal Code, section 8704.
"It follows that unless the warden of the prison in which
defendant is incarcerated believes that defendant is now insane, no court of this state baa jurisdiction to determine the
question of his sanity."
That the above quoted views and holdings of this court are
irreconcilably inconsistent with the indicated views of the
Supreme Court of the United States is apparent from a reading of Pky~ v. Dvff" (1948), "'pro, 884 U.S. a1 [68 S.Ot.
1181, 92 L.Ed. 1494]. Such quoted views are Jikewise, I I
pointed out in my dissent in In r. Pk,,~ (1947), "'prG, 80
CaL2d 838, 854, et seq., squarely contrary to the earlier holdings of this court in Gardner v. JOftU (1899), 126 CaL 614,
BuckoMfl (1900), 129 Cal.
615-616 [69 P. 126], and I ..
880, 332-833 [61 P. 1120, 60 L.R.A. 878], with which earlier
cases the views of the UDited States Supreme Court appear
to be in full accord.
The irreconcilable dUference between the United States Supreme Court and our majority is pointed up forcefully by
:Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in PAyle v. Dvffy, "'prG
(pp.",-"5 of 884: U.s.): "The court now finds that aU tkat
Ike Califomia 8upr.fM Court did toG8 to hold lkat os G matter
of California procedure [italics added] the petitioner'. claim
could not be passed on by the direct remedy of habeas eorpua,
but that there is available a special local remedy, labeled
mandamua, whereby the petitioner can judicially test hia
present sanity • • • Whatever may be the elegancies of procedure by which the matter is to be determined, our ~
declinintl to crmrider tlu tlrotl. comtitutionol UItUl tokick w.
tkougkt to. had before .., " contingent upon 41 determiMtiots
b" tke 8upr.fM Court of California tkat tlu low of lkot .tat.
is wkat our d6ciBirm ""'""ppo.,, " to b. [italics added],
namely, that CaliforDia by a remedy which California chooses
to call mandamus enables the present petitioner to secure a
judicial determination of his present sanity. Tkis fMG'nS, of
course, flOf fk. tI.ry r"tricted ,cope of relief tokick u ftOf'maU"
associated tDitk Ik. Iraditional remed" of mafldamUl. [Italics
added.] It presupposes that California atfords petitioner the
means of challenging in a substantial way the 1% parle finding
of the Superintendent of the State Hospital • • • and enables
him to secUre judicial determination of the claims he has made
in his petition for 1t.obeu corpUl, which, 80 the Court now
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holds, is not the proper way to proceed." The majority iiJ
this court now cite and rely on the above quoted proposition.
yet every member of this court knows that no such idea waS
considered or intended by this court in In re Phyle. This court
did not deny habeas corpus on the· ground that simply".
a matter of California procedure" mandamus was the proper
-and exclusively the proper-remedy; quite differently, the
majority denied habeas corpus solely and exclusively because
they intended to hold that the power of the administrative
agent was supreme and that petitioner; having been ruled
by the administrative agent, had no right· to any judicial
review. The majority opinion, as already noted, expressly
declares (pp. 840-841 of 30 Oal.2d), "The only question presented is whether a person who has been adjUdged insanc
after conviction . . • has the right to a judicial determination
of the question of his restoration to sanity." Since the question stated was the only question which the majority considered to be properly before them it is not surprising that all
the discussion in the opinion is directed to the end of supporting their declared conclusion that a person in the position i
of defendant petitioner has no right whatsoever to any judicial i
process.
Certain it is that this court did not intend to rule that
defendant petitioner did have a right to judicial review of
the administrative agent's ruling and that, having such right,
habeas corpus was an improper, and mandamus the only
proper, remedy.
That mandamus is not a proper vehicle here is apparent at
once. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and "is to be
resorted to only in cases where the usual and ordinary forms of
remedy are insufficient to afford redress." (16 Cal.Jur. § 17,
p.784.) Habeas corpus is the usual and ordinary remedy for
trying out the legality of the place of one's detention. Our
Penal Code expressly provides for just such situations as that
presented here: Section 1473 provides that "Every person
unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, under any
pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to
inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint";
sections 1486, 1487(5) and 1493 provide that when a person
is detained under court commitment but "When the person
. having the custody of the prisoner is not the person allowed
by law to detain him," the court shall exercise the writ and
"order such party to be committf'd to the restraint or custody
of such person as is by law entitled thereto." It is, and con-
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sistently has been since his adjudication of insanity, the position of defendant petitioner that the superintendent of· the
state hospitnl, not the warden of the prison, is entitled to his
custody. That posiiion is correct 80 long as defendant remains
legally insane and the judgment of the superior court perdures. Whether the final judgment of a court of record continues in effect is a question which a court, rather than a layman, should, in the last analysis, determine. Likewise, if rights
(to life or death or to property or liberty) depend on it, a
person should certainly be entitled to have a judicial determination as to whether he is legally insane. Unless the court
determines that fact neither the prisoner nor any court can
know by what standard the fact has been determined. Our
code provides no standard for determining legal insanity; our
courts have set one up for their own proceedings but there is
none prescribed for administrative agents. Even if we assume
that the hospital superintendent has the power to make a
prima facie or preliminary determination of restoration to
legal sanity his determination must be subject to judicial
review. That much seems clear from the United States
Supreme Court's language in PhyZe v. Duffy and Ng Fung
Ho v. White (1921),259 U.S. 276 [42 S.Ot. 492, 66 L.Ed. 938].
The obvious, the direct and the ordinary method for applying
the judicial test in such cases is habeas corpus.
The d1fficulty we are facing stems from the majority holding in In re PhyZe (1947), IUpra, 30 Cal.2d 838, joined with
what appears to have been spur-of-the-moment adroitness of
the attorney general in defending the majority opinion before
the Supreme Court of the United States. The error of this
court lay in holding that the ruling of the administrative
agent (the medical superintendent of a hospital) terminating
or superseding the judginent of a superior court was not subject to any judicial review in any court. The error of the
attorney general, which was accepted and relied upon by
the United States Supreme Court as thl' basis for its decision,
lay in interpreting our majority decision not as denying the
right to all judicial review but simply as denying habeas
corpus as inappropriate, while suggesting mandamus as the
appropriate, vehicle for review. But, as previously shown, our
court made and intended no such holding. Every member of
Our court knows that the majority intended to hold that the
ruling of the administrativl' agent was not subject to any
judicial review. If our court had intended a contrary holding
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-that the petitioner was entitled to a judicial review of the
administrative agent's holding; i. e., to a judicial determina-"
tion of the legality of his place of detention and the identity ,
of his jailer (see Pen. Code, §§ 1473, 1487 (5), 1493, IUp"a)-]
think it is reasonably certain that at that time a majority if
not all of the court would have held that habeas corpus was
the proper remedy. I am sure that no member of the court,
in making his decision, contemplated suggesting that the deci.
sion should be 8ustained on the theory that it admitted of
judicial review for the agent'8 ruling and that mandamus as
eontradistinguished from habeas corpus was the proper vehicle
for that review.
Unless this court is to perpetuate and encourage error, confusion, delays and cumbersome procedural griefs, both in this
eourt and elsewhere, in the administration of criminal law in '
death penalty cases the correct and exclusive procedure in such
cases as thie-habeas corp~ould be pointed out and
adhered to rather than abandoned or augmented by anadditional trial court procedure.
In the previous application for habeas corpus, the rendition
and entry of the judgment, after trial by jury, determining
petitioner to be insane were alleged and it was further averred
and not denl6d that petitioner was &till (as of that date) insane.
Unless the so-called ruling of the administrative agent that
petitioner had been restored to sanity is, as was then held by
the majority, entirely beyond judicial reach, then habeas
eorpus was and still is the proper, the plain, the direct, and
the exclusive remedy. Until, 1n re Ph"Ze that had been the
law since Kellogg v. Cochran (1890), 87 Cal. 192, 197 [25
P. 677, 12 L.R.A.I04].
It is my view that under the circumstances shown here
habeas corpus is the only proper and the moat desirable
remedy. Petitioner has already had the remedy provided by
sections 8701 and 8703 of the Penal Code. The warden did
believe that petitioner was insane; he acted on that belief;
the question of petitioner'.l8Ility was duly brought to trial
before a jury; the jury found petitioner to be insane; judgment 80 decreeing was duly entered; no motion for new trial
was made and no appeal was taken; the judgment remains
outstanding, fully valid and operative unless petitioner has
recovered his sanity. Whether or not he has recovered his
legal sanity is the decisive question. That is the fact question
for judicial determination; upon that fact depends the legal
question as to whether petitioner shall be in the custody of
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the superintendent of the hospital or that of the warden of
the prison. Habeas corpus is the established, convenient, available and ordinary remedy to try out both the factual and legal
issues.
On the other hand, if the court is to gore itself on the other
horn of its dilemma,then, as heretofore indicated, I think
that the original insanity proceedings in themselves (all had
"after ... (petitioner's] delivery to the warden for execution"), particularly in the light of the solemn judgment based
on the jury's verdict, constitute, 88 a matter of law, 'c good
reason to believe that a defendant . . • had become insane"
"after his delivery to the warden for execution" and,hence,
that if an administrative agent thereupon and thereafter
assumes to differ with such judicial determination, one of two
things should inevitably follow (at least if his ruling is challenged) : Either the judgment should be respected and upheld
as against the administrative agent or proceedings should be
had in a court of competent jurisdiction to set aside and annul
the judgment or to supersede it with one of at least equal and
later authority-one which we can know is based on the same
standard of legal insanity as was the one to be superseded.
The judgment that had been entered decreed that petitioner
was insane, committed him to the state hospital for the criminal insane, and adjudged that he be tkere confined "until his
reason be restored." The basic contention of petitioner is
that his reason, by legal standards, has not in fact been
restored. If in truth his reason, by such standards, has not
been restored the judgment already rendered fully protects
him against execution while insane; a new judgment to that
effect can add nothing; the new one could be set aside as
quickly as the old one; it would have no more prima facie or
ultimate value than the old one. There is then no occasion for
a new trial under section 3701 et sequitur. But if in truth and
upon legal standards petitioner has recovered his reason, that
fact can easily and promptly be ascertained and determined
with legal finality in a habeas corpus proceeding. There is no
occasion for inviting the uncertainty, circuity, appeals and
other delays attendant upon the added trial court procedure
here sought to be innovated.
For the reasons stated it seems obvious that at this stage
of the prosecution of Phyle and under the circumstances which
have been enumerated, the application for mandamus is inappropriate. It is inappropriate because the remedy it seeks
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has already been accorded to Phyle; he has had the jury trial
for which provision is made; he has been adjudged insane
and the judgment still stands, as fully efficacious-if Phyle
remains legally insane-as a new judgment under new proceedings could be. And the simplest and most direct vehIcle
for determining whether he is still insane by the judicial stand~
ard, the only one which avoids appeal by the petitioner, and
other indirection and causes of delay, is the ordinary one of
habeas corpus.
The total undesirability of following the newly suggested
expedient of substituting mandamus for habeas corpus or of
setting it up as an independent and additional procedure (as
a method for review of proceedings after trial and judgment of
insanity in proceedings pursuant to Penal Code, section 3701
et sequitur) is emphasized by the consideration of what must
follow if rationality and consistency are to obtain: If we
assume that the remedy petitioner seeks here is a proper one,
technically, notwithstanding the outstanding judgment, then
it would seem to follow that surely such outstanding judgment
must be accorded some weight, some prima facie significance;
it should be considered as establishing, as a matter of law,
that" good reason" exists for believing petitioner to be insane.
General legal insanity, once adjudicated, is presumed to con~
tinue until the contrary is shown. (14 Oal.Jur. § 19, p. 363;
28 Am.Jur. § 121, p. 751; Estate of Baker (1917), 176 Cal.
430, 436 [168 P. 881].) The judgment, itself, constitutes
"good reason" for believing Phyle to be insane. As emphasized in the opinion of the United States Supreme Court
(p. 443 of 334 U.S.) it is not the belief of the warden nor the
fact of insanity which must control the right to a jury trial
of sanity if the procedure under section 3701 et sequitur be
available. The court said: "In considering what the issues
may be in a mandamus proceeding, it must be borne in mind
that the warden is under a mandatory duty to initiate judicial
proceedings. not when a defendant is insane, but when 'there
i, good reason to believe' he is insane." (Italics are those of
court.) And the "judicial proceedings" so made available
are by the statute expressly and mandatorily made to encompass a jury trial. •• rT]be court must at once cause to be summoned and impaneled, from the regular jury list ... a jury
of 12 persons to bear such inquiry." (Pen. Code, § 3701.) The
duty of the warden tben would seem obvious: since "good
reason" exists for the belief that petitioner is insane, the
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warden has no power to tryout thc ultimate fact; that fact
must be determined by a jury. If mandamus be available the
warden, under the circumstances shown here, has no discretion to do otherwise than again initiate the roundabout proceedings for another jury trial and judgment which could
be, according to the majority, at once set aside by the hospital
superintendent. But whether the warden initiates such special
proceeding or not the petitioner, by this newly suggested procedure, is given a right to a hearing of lome kind i'll a triaZ
court, and, since it is in a trial court, he has a right to appeal
in the event of an adverse decision. On the other hand, if we
adhere to the traditional and statutory remedy of habeas
corpus the procedure is well defined and direct. It affords
ample protection and expeditious procedure to both the condtlmned and to the State. The protection of the state (and of
the court) against groundlMS applications is simple; it is
that which we use constantly in other applications of the writ.
We require a prima facie showing of evidentiary facts and
do not issue the writ on the bald allegation of a conclusion or
ultimate fact. By way of example, when application for the
writ is made on the ground of denial of due process in that the
prosecution has introduced and relied upon perjured testimony, with knowledge of its falsity. we require more than the
conclusionary averment of the asserted ultimate fact; we
require a specification of the evidence in detail and of the
circumstances showing knowledge of its falsity by the prosecution. A similar prima facie specification of evidentiary matters
should be required in applications for the writ under the circumstances shown here.
The present case is not controlled by WiUiams v. Duffy
(1948),82 Cal.2d 578 [197 P.2d 341]. In that case the question of the sanity of the prisoner ~ndemned to death was
raised for the first time by application for the writ of mandate.
There was not there, as there has been here, a trial and an
existing, at least prima facie valid, judicial determination that
the prisoner was insane. Whether mandamus is, or is not,
available as a remedy in an application of first instance as in
the Williams case we need not here consider.
For the reasons above stated I would affirm tile judgment
solely on the ground that under the circumstances shown
mandamus is an inappropriate. and habeas corpus is the only
appropriatl'. remedy; but if the majority are to retroactively.
as it were, adopt the suggestion of the attorney general and
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the 88S1l.IDption of the United States Supreme Court, and now
hold that mandamus is an appropriate remedy, whether exclulive or additional, then the judgment should be reversed.

Carter, J., concurred.
Appellant'. petition for a rehearing was denied August 25,
1949. Carter. J .• and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing.
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